Transnational Healing in Pauline Hopkins’s
Of One Blood; or, The Hidden Self

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Recent criticism of Pauline Hopkins’s now canonical final magazine novel, Of One Blood; or, The Hidden Self (1902–3), can generally be separated into two broad categories. On the one hand, critics such as Susan Gillman, Deborah Horvitz, Valerie Rohy, and Shawn Salvant have interrogated the ways in which the novel contests the multivalent structures of hysteria, trauma, miscegenation, and incest in an effort to undermine dominant modes of representing African Americans at the turn of the twentieth century. On the other hand, critics such as Colleen O’Brien, Kimberly Hebert, Cynthia Schrager, and Adenike Marie Davidson have looked to the ways in which the novel interacts with a pan-African model of independent black national or transnational identity in order to better define the position of African Americans both within and beyond the borders of the United States.

There are two problems with these critical readings. First, taken together, they offer an artificial distinction between the personal and the transnational. Gillman, perhaps, most resists this turn—connecting Hopkins’s revision of the occult with the contemporary science of Egyptology (57). Yet even Gillman is ultimately more concerned with how Hopkins revises US discourses of power than with Hopkins’s response to a transnational political scene. O’Brien’s excellent recent article—which focuses on Hopkins’s journalism as much as on Of One Blood—faces the same problem in reverse: O’Brien writes almost exclusively about the ways in which Hopkins develops an “insurgent cosmopolitanism,” a transnational political ideology able to confront European and US imperialism (249). While this problem is in some sense to be expected—the act of focusing necessarily occludes possible, alternative sites of focus—the unfortunate result is that contemporary scholars have ignored the ways in which, for Hopkins, the personal is the national, the transpersonal is the transnational. And this leads us to the second and far more serious problem with recent treatments of Hopkins’s final novel. By attempting to make coherent the novel’s treatment of incest or Egyptology or international cosmopolitanism, recent critics have projected a misleading coherence onto the novel as a whole. And yet the experience of reading the text is one of surprise, confusion, and, on the final page, deep anxiety for the future safety of the characters. Of One Blood does not offer readers coherence or resolution; it offers instead an overwhelming sense of contingency, provisionality, and unknowability.1

1 O’Brien’s excellent study of both Of One Blood and Hopkins’s journalism is extremely useful for understanding how the author envisioned a transnational solidarity able to “attain justice,” and yet I am less convinced by the coherence she reads into Hopkins’s work—namely, that it “anticipates an eventual transformation resulting from the ongoing struggle over resources” (267, 266). As I read the novel, it seems far more anxious about the future than predictive. Likewise, I am deeply impressed by the theoretical sophistication of Shawn Salvant’s “Pauline Hopkins

I would like to turn, then, to a literary element critics have frequently addressed—Hopkins’s use of William James’s psychological theories—in order to demonstrate first how the personal and the transnational are linked in Hopkins’s cosmology. But, more important, I will show how understanding this link will restore some of the provisionality and uncertainty to her work. The numerous critical invocations of the connections between Hopkins and James have consistently overlooked James’s stated goal. In “The Hidden Self,” which appeared in Scribner’s in March 1890 and from which Hopkins drew the subtitle for her novel, James is not simply concerned with psychic selves hierarchically related to a surface self. Rather, James writes that “nothing less than a cure of insanity—that direst of human afflictions—lies possibly at the end of such inquiries” (372). Insanity, in James’s conception, stems from trauma. It is cured, he writes, by contacting the hidden selves that obsess about past traumas and offering them reassuring, counterfactual histories. Importantly, James sees individual healing as intimately connected to social healing. Francesca Bordogna writes that James “fashioned a psychological theory that promised to eliminate selfishness and isolation” and foster “cooperation and solidarity” (531). In short, his work in psychology promises the healing of both individual and social selves.

While James certainly was not thinking of African American trauma when he imagined this social healing, it is not difficult to see why Hopkins might be attracted to this vision of psychological healing in a social context. Of One Blood translates James’s vision of social and individual healing to the pan-African black experience. It links the transpersonal or social healing of James’s psychology with the transnational vision of Hopkins’s developing political ideology. Hopkins’s invocation of a lost African civilization—existing both in the present and in the distant past—not only functions as a hidden self for marginalized blacks throughout the world but is also counterfactually constructed in opposition to the trauma of the Middle Passage. Hopkins’s novel contacts the hidden selves of diasporic blacks—their African selves—and replaces a history of colonization, kidnapping, murder, and rape with a history of past greatness, a long period of sexually and territorially protected hiding, and the promise of a renaissance.

and the End of Incest,” and yet the narrowness of his claims—namely, that Hopkins’s treatment of incestuous relationships constitutes a critique of the logic of “blood” and “race”—allows him to skirt the novel’s larger contradictions and uncertainties. Earlier critics are perhaps even more troubling. Horvitz’s claim that Hopkins’s novel is “organized by the logic of the unconscious” is problematic in two ways (257). First, it treats trauma, hysteria, and the unconscious as personal; in William James’s writings, though, the unconscious was transpersonal, as I will demonstrate at length. Perhaps even more critically, by giving the unconscious a “logic,” Horvitz attempts to organize Hopkins’s novel into a coherent program able to interpret trauma. As I will argue, the novel acknowledges the unresolvable nature of ongoing trauma. The earliest critics of the novel, such as Kevin Gaines, attempt to read a kind of bourgeois uplift ideology into Hopkins’s work. A number of critics, such as Susan Gillman and Colleen O’Brien, have effectively challenged this reading. I will only add that reading any coherent political program into Hopkins’s novel is likely a fool’s errand—not because Hopkins was incapable of imagining such a program but because her writing was sophisticated enough to acknowledge the impossibility of ameliorating ongoing, international trauma through the invocation of static ideologies.
Ultimately, however, Hopkins proves less enthusiastic than James about the possibility of healing. Hopkins wrote *Of One Blood* at the end of what Rayford Logan would call “the nadir” of race relations in the United States. It would have been misleading, writing at that time, for Hopkins to have offered any sort of political program or ideology able fully to unsettle transnational Euro-American power. Her novel acknowledges this, as I will show. While the narrative arc of the novel traces the link between personal trauma and diasporic trauma, and while it searches—frenetically, at times—for a way to heal that trauma, the story ultimately acknowledges that there are no easy answers and no ultimate healing, for individual people or for social solidarities. When *Of One Blood* concludes, the memories of trauma have not been fully expunged, and the threat of new colonization, new trauma, is ever present. In the final pages, Hopkins’s protagonist fears that “mighty nations [are] penetrating the dark, mysterious forests” of the lost city of Telassar (621). With an awareness of the unresolved threats to blacks both within and without the United States, Hopkins cannot offer to fully heal past and ongoing traumas. The threat alluded to at the close of the novel speaks to a fear for the integrity of corporeal, national, and transnational bodies. I am not arguing that the novel’s ending is hopeless or incoherent. Rather, I am arguing that it is provisional. It recognizes the linkages between personal and political tragedies, and it seeks ways to ameliorate both. And yet at the same time it recognizes what it cannot predict—namely, how and whether the ongoing trauma to diasporic black subjects can or will be ameliorated. Hopkins offers her readers a realistic ambivalence about the very system of human interconnection and healing she has proposed.

In the first part of this article, then, I will demonstrate how Hopkins in *Of One Blood* draws upon, but revises, a Jamesian vision of healing. While a number of critics have addressed the connections between Hopkins and James, none have acknowledged the ways in which James’s psychological theories were predicated on the simultaneous healing of person and society. Then I will turn to a reading of the three characters Hopkins “heals” in social and personal ways: Reuel Briggs, Dianthe Lusk, and Aubrey Livingston. Each of these healing acts is, as I will demonstrate, uncertain, troubling, and provisional. In this way, I will unsettle critical readings that, like O’Brien’s, see in Hopkins a coherent political ideology predictive of “eventual transformation” (266) and that, like Hebert’s, critique Hopkins for not offering a more coherent program—“a real Africa instead of a mythical one”—when such a “real” Africa would in fact offer very little to confront the ongoing traumas of Euro-American imperialism (261).2 I will demonstrate, in essence, that the novel’s sense of unsettled contingency is in fact the greatest marker of its success.

Before examining precisely the contours of how Hopkins conceives of and partly rejects the possibility of social healing for the African diaspora, it will first...

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2 This is not to say that “real Africa” did not offer some sense of hope. Gillman, for instance, usefully shows how the resurgence of interest in “Ethiopianism” among US blacks was defined in many ways by Ethiopia’s victory over Italy in 1896. But Ethiopia’s narrow and costly defeat of a European invader hardly offered a coherent political solution to the problems facing the international black diaspora. See also Weisbord.
be important to examine just how James conceives of psychological healing during this period. In his influential *Scribner’s* article of March 1890, James examines the work of two disciples of French scientist Jean-Martin Charcot—Pierre Janet and Alfred Binet (“Hidden Self”). Both scientists had been working toward a greater understanding of how multiple personalities function within a single person. But James saw the possibility of an even more profound discovery within their work. Schrager writes that “Janet’s more conservative view was that the subpersonalities he uncovered were limited by the boundaries of the individual ego; in contrast, James was receptive to the possibility that the unconscious might open onto the transpersonal realm and provide an avenue of communication with the spirit world” (308). James sees the possibility that all human consciousness is linked. In his essay, he writes that he knows of a “non-hysterical” or psychologically healthy woman who, when placed in a trance state, “knows facts which altogether transcend her possible normal consciousness” (“Hidden Self” 373). For James, there is a transpersonal undercurrent to consciousness, a way in which individual personalities are linked across time and space. Importantly, however, James explores this link not merely for the sake of scientific inquiry—although he is certainly also interested in knowledge for its own sake. Rather, James expresses the possibility that better understanding of multiple personalities, trance states, and the links between unconscious minds will lead to “nothing less than the cure of insanity” (372).

The key to this cure for insanity is embodied in the story of a woman named Marie—a woman whose story James borrows from Janet’s book, *L’automatisme psychologique* (1889). It will be useful to recount Marie’s story at some length here because it proves central to James’s argument and ultimately, I think, informs Hopkins’s project. According to James, Marie came to the hospital with “monthly convulsive crises, chill, fever, delirium, attacks of terror, etc., lasting for days, together with shifting anaesthesias and contractures all the time, and a fixed blindness of the left eye” (“Hidden Self” 372). Janet determines that all of these problems have a psychological basis—they are rooted in three traumas Marie suffered in childhood: at the age of thirteen, she immersed herself in cold water; at the age of sixteen, she saw an old woman fall to her death; and at the age of six, she was forced to sleep in the same bed as another child, “the left half of whose face bore a disgusting eruption” (372). Janet determines that all of these problems have a psychological basis—they are rooted in three traumas Marie suffered in childhood: at the age of thirteen, she immersed herself in cold water; at the age of sixteen, she saw an old woman fall to her death; and at the age of six, she was forced to sleep in the same bed as another child, “the left half of whose face bore a disgusting eruption” (372). It is here that James advocates Janet’s clinical regime, which is based upon the manufacturing of counterfactual pasts. James writes:

> Accordingly M. Janet, replacing her in this wise [under hypnosis] at the age of six, [he] made her go through the bed-scene again, but gave it a different dénouement. He made her believe that the horrible child had no eruption and was charming. . . . He made her re-enact the scene of the cold immersion, but gave it also an entirely different result. He made her live again through the old woman’s accident, but substituted a comical issue for the old tragical one. (372–73)

James here offers a solution to the problem of trauma: simply force the patient to forget that the trauma happened—by replacing it with more pleasant memories—and she will return to a state of normality. Marie, we learn both from Janet and
from James, has no further symptoms after her treatment (373). Through the experience of counterfactual histories, constructed while patients are in an altered state of consciousness, sufferers are able to literally forget the past. Bordogna points out that there is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of James’s psychology: he offers a self that is divided and weak and yet promotes a kind of muscular individualism or self-possession. She writes: “James transformed the weak and divided self into a tool that people could use in order to achieve renewed strength and agency” (520). In essence, James promotes a stronger sense of individual empowerment by highlighting the weakness, the dividedness, of the individual mind. In Marie’s case, then, we see the production of a stronger individual through the destruction of that individual’s past. Because Marie’s history has weakened her in the present, her history is overwritten.

But James’s desire to promote individual empowerment is not simply or only conducted in service to the individual. Bordogna writes: “James addressed what he perceived to be a fundamental tension: that between the claims of society and those of the individual, between a new tendency toward a full socialization of life and individuals’ desire to retain autonomy and moral agency” (508). While this tension is less visible in “Hidden Self,” it certainly appears throughout James’s other psychological work—in particular, the two volumes of *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) and the single-volume *Psychology* (1892). In the latter book, James writes that greater intelligence is and has always been associated with the ability to plan for the future needs of all humankind. He writes: “In all ages the man whose determinations are swayed by reference to the most distant ends has been held to possess the highest intelligence.” These range from “the tramp who lives from hour to hour” to the “philosopher and saint whose cares are for all humanity and for eternity” (*Psychology* 101). Here, then, is the way in which James reconciles the relationship between the individual and the larger community. The individual—divided, weak, harangued by history—must strive for a unity that will enable him or her to serve the larger, eternal needs of humankind. This is not to say absolute unity is possible. As Wayne Viney, Cheri L. King, and D. Brett King point out, James was an unrepentant pluralist, a believer in the multiplicity of individualities and principles (91–100). Rather, this is to say that James believed that the selves could be reconciled in order to allow for the harmonious action of the individual within a larger, interconnected society.

If this is the case, then, it is easy to see how James’s psychology would be attractive to Hopkins. In her biography of the *Colored American Magazine* editor and writer, Lois Brown explains that *Of One Blood* functioned in contrast to the “devastation that the ‘peculiar institution’ of American slavery brought upon women, girls, and families” (388). Juxtaposed against the widespread rape culture of the US slave system, Hopkins could construct a legacy of matriarchal African nationhood. She could write about Ethiopian women—such as Queen Candace and the Queen of Sheba—who ascended the throne in biblical and Arabic histories. Brown rightly points out that Hopkins constructs a vision that is meant to be reliable—the historical allusiveness of her novel is meant to indicate to readers that these histories are true and accurate (388–89). Moreover, read in the context of Ethiopia’s 1896
victory over Italy, a story about the historical greatness of Ethiopia can be read as a claim to black power at the end of the nineteenth century. But in some sense these histories were also counterfactual—they were, in fact, fictions. Hopkins uses Ethiopia as a double for the black experience in the United States. Importantly, the history of miscegenation—and, by implication, rape—is inscribed even onto the bodies of those who in the novel have been protected from Euro-American imperialism for thousands of years. When Reuel Briggs, the novel’s protagonist, is first confronted by the inhabitants of the lost city of Telassar, he reflects that “they ranged in complexion from a creamy tint to purest ebony; the long hair which fell upon their shoulders, varied in texture from soft, waving curls to the crispness of the most pronounced African type” (Hopkins, Blood 545).

The Africans who here represent preserved greatness and territorial integrity are also amalgamated, to use a nineteenth-century word. Their bodies represent a history of sexual interactions with Europeans. Despite this, the city has never been penetrated, and the women have not been raped. Queen Candace—who is to be Briggs’s wife and looks almost exactly like Briggs’s wife in the United States—remains a virgin. Here, Hopkins constructs the same counterfactual doubling Pierre Janet advocates, as articulated in James’s Scribner’s article. Just as Marie’s memory of tragic death is replaced by a comic fall, the actual history of slavery and rape—made visible in the varying shades of skin color among the inhabitants of Telassar—is replaced by a history of protected virginity.

The counterfactual histories James and Janet advocate, moreover, were in some sense already part of Hopkins’s work. Counterfactual histories are, after all, simply fictions. Borrowing from Hazel V. Carby’s seminal Reconstructing Womanhood, Susan Hays Bussey writes that Hopkins was concerned in all of her work with producing “fictional histories” able to counter oppression (Carby 128; Bussey 299). These “fictional histories” allowed Hopkins to demonstrate how individual outcomes are “fated by inheritance from the past,” according to Bussey (299). But I would add that in Of One Blood Hopkins sees a greater utility implicit in these fictional or counterfactual histories. In the note to her first novel, Contending Forces (1900), Hopkins writes that “[f]iction is . . . a record of growth and development

While the war between Ethiopia and Italy has largely been forgotten by contemporary scholars, it was significant at the time. Newspapers throughout the United States covered the conflict, and in many cases these newspapers took the side of Ethiopia. The effect on African American intellectuals must have been significant. See, in particular, “Italy’s Predicament,” which appeared in the Boston Daily Advertiser in 1896. In this collection of excerpts from other major newspapers of the day, Boston African Americans (perhaps including Hopkins and her peers) would have been able to read depictions of black Ethiopian nationalism as fundamentally akin to US nationalism. The Advertiser quotes the Malden (Massachusetts) News, for instance, which wrote: “The Italians have received a severe knockout in Abyssinia. The Abyssinians are a Christian and warlike people. What business has Italy in Abyssinia anyway? The greedy policy of European nations to grab all Asia and Africa—yes, and America if they can—will react with terrific force some day.” Here, as elsewhere, brave Abyssinia (Ethiopia) is put nearly on par with the United States—both nations have a “Christian and warlike” people and defend against the incursions of European imperialists. But, as I will argue below, the value of a territorially protected African nation had by the end of the nineteenth century more to do with advocating black uplift than with advocating for emigration.
from generation to generation” (13–14). But in Of One Blood, fiction has emerged as offering a slightly different possibility—a rewriting of the past able to underpin a more stable, interconnected, and psychologically whole future. The novel seems to offer a “factual” history of the great civilizations of Africa. But the survival of that historical culture in Telassar is clearly a counterfactual, a fiction that does not narrate the past but rewrites it. For James, as I have argued, fictions were central to the process of healing. And throughout Hopkins’s career, the fictionalization of history seems to have been central to the process of cementing “the bond of brotherhood among all classes and all complexions,” as she writes in her preface to Contending Forces (13). In Of One Blood, Hopkins borrows from a Jamesian conception of counterfactual histories and their healing potential. The potential for fictions to help resolve racial conflict informed much of her career, but here she adds an implicitly counterfactual, socially healing layer. Africa not only represents a site of historical greatness (which, arguably, it did); it represents a site protected from European imperialism (which, clearly, it did not). Hopkins gives readers a counterfactual fiction designed to heal a terrible past just as Marie was given three fictions designed to overwrite her traumatic personal past.

This is not to say that Hopkins embraces the Jamesian approach wholesale. On the contrary, Of One Blood moves between an embrace of James’s methods and approaches and a rejection of them. The novel’s frequent allusions to Jamesian psychology—from the subtitle on—should be read not as homage to a popular set of psychological principles but rather as a complex response to those principles. The initial connection to James is made explicit in the opening scene. The novel begins with protagonist Briggs—a “passing” black medical student at Harvard—reading a book called The Unclassified Residuum, by “M. Binet” (441–43). The “Unclassified Residuum” of the title is a reference to the first line of James’s “Hidden Self,” in which James writes, “‘The great field for new discoveries,’ said a scientific friend to me the other day, ‘is always the Unclassified Residuum.’” (361). The idea here is that there is a kind of “dust-cloud of exceptional observations” surrounding the known principles established by scientists and that these unexplained yet explainable phenomena are kept as the purview of mystics until scien-

4 Schrager writes: “Recasting James’s ‘unclassified residuum’ as the legitimate epistemological domain of Western science’s racial and sexual Other, Of One Blood reclaims . . . discredited knowledge—of Africa, of the maternal—as an antidote to the psychic and spiritual alienation of dominant American culture” (322–23). Schrager sees Hopkins’s use of James essentially as an extension—meaning, in essence, that Hopkins sees the utility of Jamesian theory for African Americans while simultaneously seeing the ways in which an African context can resolve tensions inherent in James’s work. My argument is related, but somewhat different. I argue that Hopkins never fully accepts Jamesian methodologies. While Of One Blood advocates—with James and against most psychologists of the time—that transpersonal healing is possible, Hopkins seems to disagree with James’s methods. Forgetting trauma, the novel argues, is impossible and not necessarily desirable.

5 Hopkins here is clearly referring to Alfred Binet, one of the two figures central to “Hidden Self.” Interestingly, however, Hopkins counterfactually attributes James’s theories of a transcendent mind to Binet. Unlike both Binet and Janet, James believed that the human mind could transcend its boundaries, accessing information beyond the limits of normal consciousness.
tists endeavor to explain them rationally (ibid.). The connections between Hopkins and James here go further. Hopkins quotes The Unclassified Residuum as Briggs reads it, and these quotations are taken directly from James’s article. Significantly, Hopkins, with James and against Janet and Binet, asserts that human thought is not bounded by its own position, that it is possible to know facts that “transcend” the “possible normal consciousness” (“Hidden Self” 373; and Hopkins, Blood 443). This is a useful plot device for Hopkins. It allows Briggs to have visions of his future wife, Dianthe Lusk, and to connect with her after he departs for Africa.

Even more significantly, however, telepathic communication—and its failures and misunderstandings—prove central to Hopkins’s cosmology. In the novel, Briggs is forced to leave on an expedition to Africa immediately after marrying the beautiful mulatta Lusk. Briggs’s ostensible friend, the southern aristocrat Aubrey Livingston, has secretly told possible employers that Briggs is black. While Briggs is away, Livingston murders his own fiancée, Molly Vance, in what is made to look like a boating accident. Livingston then uses mesmerism to marry Lusk against her will. Briggs sees the accident telepathically, but believes Lusk has died. Here we see the enacted Jamesian belief that “the unconscious might open onto the transpersonal realm” (Schrager 308). Hopkins embraces James’s fairly radical claim, which runs counter to most other psychologists of the time, that human minds are interconnected below the level of consciousness. Briggs’s own consciousness is able to cross an ocean. If Hopkins is concerned with the possibility of healing, she makes it clear through these interactions that the healing will be pandiasporic. After Briggs discovers that he is the lost king of the hidden city of Telassar, he learns—once more through telepathy—that his wife in the United States has not been killed. But, significantly, it is Ai, the African minister who attends Briggs after he becomes King Ergamenes, who reveals Lusk’s imprisonment on Livingston’s plantation. The representative of preserved African heritage is connected—below the level of normal consciousness—with the suffering African American. These transpersonal connections are brought into the corporeal world when Briggs returns with secret agents from Telassar to seek revenge. The sufferings of African Americans, according to the logic of the novel, are connected transpersonally and corporeally to the struggles of Africa. Hopkins’s use of Jamesian psychology, then, makes visible the links between these multiple sites of oppression.

A number of critics have noted the ways in which Hopkins uses the metaphor of blood to undermine polygenesist ideology, to argue that all humanity is “of one blood.” I would extend this to say that, equally critically, the novel puts forward the belief that all humanity is, if not of one mind, then able to access shared consciousness. Salvant argues that Of One Blood functions by demonstrating that “one cannot maintain ‘pure races’ protected against miscegenation without an incestuous doctrine of blood purity” (674). According to Salvant, the novel shows that an attempt to maintain blood purity among separate races is itself a kind of incest. Hopkins demonstrates that, if all races are of one blood, then all relationships are incestuous and therefore none are. I argue that the novel’s subtitle—“The Hidden Self”—does much the same work as the main title. If all races are of one blood, then all people share a “hidden self.” In other words, the connections between individual minds, which Hopkins establishes in the opening pages by quoting James, will
allow all people to connect through a single consciousness even as they are linked through a single, human bloodline. And it is this shared, transpersonal consciousness that offers hope for healing the traumas of oppression, rape, and enslavement. Janet’s theories only offered the “cure of insanity” for individuals (James, “Hidden Self” 372). But James’s extension of Janet’s theories—the radical belief that individual consciousness is not bounded by the individual mind—allows Janet’s methodology for the treatment of individuals to become a Jamesian treatment for social, transpersonal, and transnational maladies. As Brown points out, Hopkins was writing at a time of increased interest in pan-African identity and pride (387). But, unlike earlier writers—such as Martin Delany, who imagines sites of black nationhood as places to which African Americans and other diasporic blacks could go—Africa for Hopkins has more to do with global uplift. Hopkins’s novel argues for a mythic Africa, one that offers a coherent, transpersonal, and transnational identity to diasporic blacks.

After Briggs is renamed Ergamenes and takes power in Telassar, his chief counselor, Ai, explains the faith of the lost African nation—a faith that bears striking resemblance to James’s conception of the self. Ai explains:

> Our religion is a belief in One Supreme Being, the center of action in all nature. He distributed a portion of Himself at an early age to the care of man who has attained the highest development of any of His terrestrial creatures. We call this ever-living faculty or soul Ego. . . . The Ego preserves its individuality after the dissolution of the body. We believe in re-incarnation by natural laws regulating material on earth. The Ego can never be destroyed. (Of One Blood 562)

While there are differences here between Ai’s “Ego” and James’s self, the similarities are striking. In *Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine* (1898), James posits the possibility that minds are interconnected below the level of consciousness. Borrowing from Gustav Theodor Fechner, James argues that consciousness varies (from grogginess to alertness), but we are never so alert as to be fully cognizant of our ever-present interconnectedness (64–66). As James asserts in “Hidden Self,” the possibilities for human thought are not bounded by individual consciousness (373). There are differences between James and Hopkins here. James takes on the idea of ego as universal soul directly in his *Psychology*: he argues that there is not enough clear evidence to assert that a universal ego functions as a “permanent being” (200–201). Despite this, however, the central tension in James’s self is visible in Hopkins’s (or Ai’s) Ego: the individual is connected to all other individuals and yet retains his or her selfhood. “The Ego,” Ai tells Briggs, “preserves its individuality after the dissolution of the body.” As Bordogna writes, this is essential to James’s psychology, and it is equally essential to his social vision (526).

Bordogna argues that “James’s account of the self, while depriving the individual self of substantiality and metaphysical unity, was designed to give people, or at least some people, agency and ultimately the ability to ‘revitalize’ and regenerate American society” (ibid.). According to Bordogna, James saw the psychologically divided thinker—the elite man who, like James himself, might suffer from neur-
asthenia or depression—as a kind of social leader. As David G. Schuster writes, these conflicts of mind were explicitly linked to a class of mind workers. “As a diagnosis,” Schuster explains, “neurasthenia . . . [allowed doctors to] attribute a bank manager’s headaches to his hectic schedule and the obsession for detail his job demanded” (2327). Fraught mental conditions, in short, were associated with elite work, with mental tasks, and with modernity. And the forward movement of society at large, James writes, depends upon these kinds of workers and their work. James explains that all human progress depends upon the “initiatives on the part of inventors, great or small, and imitation by the rest of us” (“Social Value” 170). James, remember, put “philosopher(s) and saint(s)” at the top of his human hierarchy (Psychology 101).

In the figure of Briggs, then, Hopkins has created an ideal Jamesian leader. Briggs begins the novel suffering from depression—he is near suicide—because he suffers from a psychologically divided self. Even as Briggs attempts to invent, to solve the intellectual puzzle of the hidden self, he wonders: “Is suicide wrong?” (Hopkins 441). But Hopkins’s portrayal of a divided mind is not simple here. She gives us both a classic case of the mind worker’s diseased and divided consciousness and the passing black man’s internal division from trauma. Briggs could be modeled both on James himself (the Harvard intellectual with a depressive cast of mind) and on Marie (Janet’s traumatized patient), but he could also be modeled on something else. Briggs suffers from “double-consciousness,” as in W. E. B. Du Bois’s conception. In an 1897 Atlantic Monthly article, written before The Souls of Black Folk (1903), Du Bois explains: “It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (194).

What is interesting about this double consciousness is that it is peculiar to the African American experience and yet modeled on a psychological framework that was peculiar to white elites. When Du Bois writes that African Americans are forced to measure their souls “by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity,” his analysis is firmly rooted in the experience of segregation, prejudice, and exclusion. And yet the internal experience—how this “two-ness” manifests itself by threatening to tear the individual apart—exhibits the characteristics of a popular psychological diagnosis.6 As James explains Janet’s research in “Hidden Self,” the multiple consciousnesses of patients—their double- or triple-ness—directly manifest themselves in their bodies. (Remember Marie’s

6 I am not the first to identify the links between Du Bois’s “double-consciousness” and the psychology of his time. See Peter Coviello esp. 3. Coviello writes that Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness bore “a marked indebtedness to William James, the pragmatist philosopher and early scholar of psychology with whom Du Bois had studied at Harvard University. In fact, William mailed his brother, Henry, a copy of The Souls of Black Folk, calling it ‘a decidedly moving book,’ and Henry, in turn, cited it (somewhat backhandedly) in The American Scene.” See also Nahum Dimitri Chandler and Kelli Zaytoun esp. 67.
list of afflictions: “monthly convulsive crises, chill, fever, delirium, attacks of terror, etc., lasting for days, together with shifting anæsthesias and contractures all the time, and a fixed blindness of the left eye” [372].) This is Briggs’s experience by the midpoint of Hopkins’s novel. Even after coming to Africa and being made ruler of the lost civilization of Meroë, Briggs is troubled with a kind of double consciousness: he has been betrothed to Queen Candace—a “bronze” doppelganger of Lusk—but he still thinks about his (presumably dead) wife in the United States. When Briggs realizes that his life has been doubled, that Lusk still lives even as he is promised to Queen Candace, Hopkins writes that “he involuntarily shuddered, a half suppressed groan escaped him, and he grew ashy pale. In a trice he became entirely unnerved, and staggered back and forth like a drunken man” (578). Briggs’s double consciousness—he is a US citizen and an African king, “an American” and “a Negro”—threatens to tear him apart. The psychological twoness manifests itself as physical malady.

It is important here to note that the two-ness is necessarily transnational. A number of critics have pointed to the ways in which Hopkins’s novel is invested in a global perspective. Davidson, for instance, writes that Of One Blood “opens a window into the global concerns of dispersed Africans at the turn of the twentieth century” (85). Gillman writes that “Of One Blood represents the turn in [Hopkins’s] thinking, as well as that in the larger community of black activist intellectuals, toward defining the ‘race problem’ as global rather than merely domestic” (58). Hopkins was, I think, moving beyond an understanding of the psychology that limited black double consciousness to the United States. But rather than position herself simply or only as a kind of pan-African nationalist, I would argue, she focuses in her novel on the singular recognition that domestic black double consciousness is transnational. When Du Bois writes that the African American must be both “an American” and “a Negro,” his juxtaposition points to the transnational dimension of this psychological duality. The American “Negro problem” stems from the belief that blackness is otherness—that it is African, foreign. By responding to the same cultural forces to which Du Bois responded, Hopkins is able to present in Briggs a protagonist who embraces his African self not as a rejection of his US identity but rather as a recognition of the two-ness of that identity.

And this is where my argument intersects with and partly departs from O’Brien’s. O’Brien identifies this strain of Hopkins’s activism as “insurgent cosmopolitanism,” and I think the name is appropriate. Throughout her political nonfiction, Hopkins advocated a “transnational identity” for African Americans that could encompass the “landscapes worldwide that are the province of the ‘dark races’” (O’Brien 258). In essence, Hopkins proposed a vision of an interconnected, transnational black identity. And this insurgent cosmopolitanism should be distinguished from back-to-Africa movements, in which a black nation or nations became the grounds from which to advocate for rights. Characterizing Hopkins’s Voice of the Negro series (1904–5) and A Primer of Facts (1905), O’Brien explains that Hopkins advocated a kind of transnational black cosmopolitanism that would not be subsumed by the civilizing mission of Anglo-American imperialism but nonetheless remained distinct from an explicitly back-to-Africa political agenda (261–62).
My argument departs from O’Brien’s, however, in two ways. First, Hopkins’s novel is shot through with uncertainty about the insurgent cosmopolitan vision it proposes, as I will explore at greater length below. For the moment, though, it will be useful to examine an “Editorial and Publishers’ Announcements” page in the first issue of the Colored American Magazine to include Of One Blood. In this announcement, the magazine’s editors declare that “we are opposed to any wholesale movement to Africa,” but at the same time they warn that the development of British Sierra Leone because of emigration will give “commercial America” something “to think about” (77). Visible here is the same ambivalence that would shape the novel itself. The editors do not advocate a “return” to Sierra Leone but nonetheless think emigration will give “commercial America” something “to think about.” But what, precisely, will commercial America think about? African greatness? The possibility for black-only commercial success? A future of powerful African nations or a resurgent black diaspora? There is clearly faith that the rising power of the African diaspora will lead to systemic change, but there is also deep uncertainty about how this change will take place or how precisely the insurgent cosmopolitans of the world might bring it about.

Second, as I have explored above, if Hopkins is attempting to access the hidden self of her African American characters, what she is really after is a way to deal with trauma. Du Bois’s invocation of “double-consciousness,” a phrase laden with psychological meaning at the end of the nineteenth century, maps both the ways in which individual African Americans were saddled with divided minds and the ways in which black US citizenry was divided in its sense of national affiliation. The trauma is both personal and transnational—and the only model available to confront such transpersonal suffering must be one that connects human beings across these matrices of interconnection. In the case of Briggs—and, ultimately, in the case of Lusk—access to the “African” self is a way of confronting a trauma that stems from both the personal (in Briggs’s case, his figurative emasculation by a southern plantation owner) and the transnational (Briggs’s legacy as a diasporic subject). But, as I have already argued, this link between the personal and the transnational is shot through with provisionality—an uncertainty about the healing potential of any system in a world of ongoing trauma. Below, then, I will explore how each of the three central characters—Briggs, Lusk, and Livingston—are healed at the level of the personal and the transnational and disclose how each of these moments of healing is provisional, ambivalent, and uncertain.

Importantly, all transpersonal healing in the novel seems to follow the format James offers in “Hidden Self”: the traumatized figure experiences an altered level of consciousness (as in Janet’s hypnosis), he or she experiences duality, and then, finally, this duality is reconciled. For Briggs, this experience begins after he is first led to believe that Lusk is dead. Despairing at the knowledge that she has been killed, Briggs wanders off by himself. Shortly after, smelling a subtle odor, he “sank upon the ground” as “consciousness left him” (544). Upon waking, Briggs becomes familiar with his other identity—he is Ergamenes, the lost king of
Telassar. Throughout the remainder of the novel, this identity comes to supplant his identity as Briggs, Harvard-educated doctor and husband to Lusk. This transference carries all the trappings of a Jamesian psychological treatment. His threshold of consciousness is altered, and he is offered a counterfactual history. Rather than being unable to provide for a family, he is made to possess untold riches; rather than being powerless to protect the sexual purity of his wife, he marries the virginal Queen Candace, who is defended by the full power of the state. One detects here the experience of Marie, who, under hypnosis from Janet, is told that the sight of an old woman falling tragically to her death was actually humorous (“Hidden Self” 373). Hopkins has, in some sense, used Jamesian methods to heal Briggs’s double consciousness.

And yet Briggs is not fully healed. Forgetting, it turns out, is actually impossible. And perhaps more significantly, the possibility of new trauma always remains. In the final moments of the novel, Briggs returns to Telassar with old Aunt Hannah, his grandmother. “There,” Hopkins’s narrator tells us, “he spends his days in teaching his people all that he has learned in years of contact with modern culture. United to Candace, his days glide peacefully by in good works” (621). In some sense, this seems idyllic—the double consciousness, the suicidal impulses, and the neurasthenic manifestations of his diseased psychology are gone. But the memory remains with him. Not only is Aunt Hannah—a woman who was literally once a slave—still with him, but the memory of Briggs’s past traumas has clearly not been erased. Hopkins writes that “the shadows of great sins darken his life, and the memory of past joys is ever with him” (ibid.). Briggs is left with the memories of his failure to protect Lusk. Unlike Marie, whose traumas Janet is able to fully erase, Briggs keeps the traumas with him even as he lives out the counterfactual narrative constructed in opposition to those traumas. Importantly, Hopkins retains the possibility of future trauma as well. Throughout the novel, Telassar has been portrayed as an impregnable secret fortress. Outsiders enter it only with the express permission of Ai, Ergamenes’s chief minister. But when Of One Blood comes to a close, Briggs (or Ergamenes) is said to view “with serious apprehension, the advance of mighty nations penetrating the dark, mysterious forests of his native land” (621). The trauma of the Middle Passage, of colonization, of discrimination threatens to repeat itself. The counterfactual fiction of a fully protected African space is revealed as just that—a fiction. While the psychological trauma is (partly) reconciled, African American readers are reminded that the entire black diaspora continues to be threatened. There is no safe space, and the “problem” of the color line is a global one. Hopkins’s African American readers are made to worry for Africa and are thus reminded that they are, as Du Bois would have it, both “American” and “Negro.”

This experience of reconciling the multivalent structures of consciousness is far more complex in the case of Lusk, who is mirrored by Queen Candace in the logic of the novel. Lusk is a more problematic figure because—like the tragic mulat-tas in so many other stories of the period—she is sexually violated and must die to restore a sense of moral balance. As Brown points out, Lusk and her mother, Mira, are “bound by physical scars that [seem] to prevent them from transcendent reverse diasporic migrations . . . [but] Hopkins endeavored to bring Africa
to them” (392–93). Unlike Briggs, whose mind can be reconciled when he goes to Africa and comes to embody a new identity, Lusk (and her dead mother, who appears in visions) cannot be restored in this way. And yet in Hopkins’s cosmology, Lusk does not fully die. At the close of the novel, as Lusk is dying, she hears a “vast” orchestra of African history passing by. She rises from the sofa and shouts, “All hail, my royal ancestors—Candace, Semiramis, Dido, Solomon, David and the great kings of early days, and the great masters of the world of song” (615). Added to this list are Mozart and Beethoven. As the footsteps of this divine, ancient orchestra approach, Lusk dies in her husband’s arms (616). This moment personifies the possibilities for healing with perhaps even greater clarity than Briggs’s reinvention as Ergamenes. Here we see what Brown describes as a “juxtaposition of African matriarchal power against African American female subjugation” (387–88). The queens—Candace, Semiramis, Dido—are listed alongside the kings, Solomon and David. More important still, they are all listed alongside a pair of musical greats: Mozart and Beethoven. The reconstruction here is complex. Lusk is being welcomed into the line of African queens. The fact that she looks identical to Queen Candace of Telassar allows the logic of the novel to treat the two women as virtually identical. In some sense, Lusk is Queen Candace. Briggs has not married two women; he has married one—but he has fully embraced her more spiritually whole identity. Queen Candace is Lusk’s counterfactual identity, her self, in the Jamesian sense, made more fully whole through the healing process.

But, just as critically, Lusk is presented here not simply as connected to Dido and Candace—she is connected to King Solomon and Mozart. Just as all humanity is “of one blood” and therefore corporeally interconnected, all humanity also seems to share a universal, hidden self, in the Jamesian sense. This does not erase the individuality of each self. Instead, this hidden self is a link between multiple, internally divided individuals. Here, my argument about the universal selfhood of human beings in the novel echoes Salvant’s argument about the function of blood in the text. Salvant argues that the universal interconnection of all human beings in the novel through the nexus of shared blood relationships necessarily highlights the “biblical imperative of brotherhood” even as it undercuts the associations between blackness and incest (674). The universality of a hidden self, then, simultaneously undercuts the trauma experienced by black women (by offering a sexually protected African identity) and links black women to a broader framework that includes all humanity, black or white, male or female. And just as Hopkins draws on the science of racial development in order to simultaneously demonstrate the universality of blood relations and the greatness of African “blood,” she relies on Jamesian psychology to link Lusk simultaneously to a tradition of great African women and to a tradition of universal, human greatness.

Importantly, Lusk’s death gives readers an opportunity to see psychological treatment played out once more in the narrative. Just as in the scene in which Briggs is knocked out by a poisonous gas, the scene of Lusk’s death depicts a changing level of consciousness. It resembles, in some ways, one of Pierre Janet’s treatments. Lusk, on a sofa, is insensible to the world around her as she has visions of the parade of human greatness approaching—she sees Dido, Candace, Mozart, Solomon. Those in the room look on, unable to see what Lusk sees; Lusk, in turn,
seems unable to perceive the corporeal or “real” world around her (615). In this state of altered consciousness, a counterfactual history is presented to her. Her personal history of trauma is erased: forgotten, at least in that moment, are the mother and grandmother abused by a white plantation owner, the husband who turns out to be her brother, and the “white” man who sexually abuses her and who turns out to be her brother, as well. In place of these traumas, we have an orchestra of human genius intimately linked with the insensible woman on the sofa. (And this orchestra, perhaps, recalls Lusk’s role as a singer of African American spirituals earlier in the novel.) The selves associated with Lusk’s abuse are erased. Her selves associated with greatness, with safety, are brought to the forefront. And in this psychologically whole state, she is allowed to die—but, through Queen Candace, to live on. In “Hidden Self,” James writes that “a waking hysteric is like a well person in the hypnotic trance. Both are wholly lost in their present idea, its normal ‘reductives’ and correctives having lapsed from view” (364). Lusk’s own hysteria in this final moment models the hypnotic treatment Janet’s patient Marie received. Lusk experiences an altered state of consciousness and, through this consciousness, sees her many selves reconciled, her trauma erased, and her connection to the larger field of humanity reified.

This is not to fully absolve Hopkins of charges that she is repeating a hypermasculine trope by allowing the tragic mulatta of her book to die. Brown attempts to explain this by writing that “Hopkins’s tragic heroine achieves a powerful disembodiment, one that allows her to escape the sexualization and trauma that as the child of women enslaved in America she inherits and experiences” (393). Lusk is not fully “killed,” in this reading, but is instead transformed. She becomes Queen Candace. I think the text of the novel bears this interpretation out. But this reading is, understandably, unsatisfying for contemporary readers. While the novel seems to offer readers a family made whole—Ergamenes and Queen Candace—this achievement carries with it a realization that the sexually violated woman has to die in order to make this reconciliation possible. By relying upon psychological motifs, Hopkins tapped into a discourse that consistently pathologized female sexuality. Daria Columbo points out that Sigmund Freud’s work in the 1890s and later is shot through with “sexually forthright or even aggressive” nursemaids and governesses who molest the young boys in their care (836). James’s work seems to take an opposite tack—highlighting accounts of profoundly helpless and victimized women. Summarizing Janet’s work, for instance, James writes that “an hysteric woman abandons part of her consciousness because she is too weak nervously to hold it all together” (“Hidden Self” 371). A woman, it seems, contains a greater potential for nervous weakness than even the harangued banker or philosopher.

But there is something else at work here. For Hopkins, offering a counterfactual version of Lusk means making her, once again, virginal. And if sexual experience immutably marks one’s body—as the ideology of “virginity” seems to imply—then her body must be transformed in order to be healed. Brown writes that Lusk and Mira are “bound by physical scars” (392). Within the ideology of the novel, I think this is correct. Lusk represents the precise opposite of the many-hued inhabitants of Telassar, who have never encountered Europeans but nonetheless bear the physical marks of European contact. Lusk’s body has been invisibly “marked” by
her sexual experiences and can only be made new through reinvention. Remember also that “Queen Candace” is reembodied every fifteen years. Ai explains that “from among [the virgins of the city] Candace chooses her successor at intervals of fifteen years” (561). Working as she was with two premises, that women are psychologically weak and that sexual experience marks their bodies immutably, Hopkins heals Lusk only by replacing her. There is something deeply troubling, but unsurprising, about this. Moreover, the more fundamental reinvention of Lusk than of Briggs points to the contingency of Hopkins’s work with this counterfactual or fictional approach to reconciling African American double consciousness. The novel is provisional in its embrace of transpersonal interconnection and healing. Briggs is healed but remains worried about future trauma. Lusk is healed but only through her death and transformation into Queen Candace.

This ambivalence is perhaps most visible in the text’s treatment of Livingston. Davidson writes that Briggs is troubled in ways that Livingston cannot be. Because Briggs knows of his own blackness, he suffers by passing. Livingston, unaware of his blackness, does not suffer (86). And yet the novel presents us, in the end, with the figure of a psychologically conflicted “white” man made conflicted by the very traumas he has perpetrated. When Briggs returns to find Lusk dying, Livingston begins hearing voices. In a kind of trance, Livingston wonders if he hears Lusk’s voice—wonders if she has survived the poison he forced her to drink. He follows the sound of her voice, and, Hopkins writes, “he saw the two figures lightly in advance of him. This time Dianthe’s face was turned away, but the silver moonbeams threw into bold relief the accusing face of Molly Vance” (618). At this moment in the novel, both Lusk and Vance are dead. And yet Livingston, in a trance-like state, is troubled by their presence. He is, in the medical parlance of his time, hysterical. And even after he is able to beat the lawsuits brought against him by Briggs and the Vance family, he remains troubled. When Briggs, Ai, and others seek him out a short time later—to force him to commit suicide—Hopkins describes Livingston as a disturbed, hollow man. She writes: “An open book was on his knees, but his eyes were fixed on vacancy. He was changed and his auburn locks were prematurely gray. His eyes revealed an impenetrable mystery” (619). Livingston has been psychologically divided by the same crimes that divided the minds of Lusk and Briggs. All three characters—Briggs, Lusk, and Livingston—play roles in a dramatic recreation of the psychological traumas of slavery and its aftermath. And each is revealed to have more complex, multiple, and shifting identities than the single role provided for them by the narrative of white patriarch, cuckolded black man, and raped mulatta.

In Livingston’s case, this means that he is both white patriarch and passing black man; he is both the perpetrator of traumas and, in the end, the victim. As Briggs’s lost brother, he is, after all, also a member of the royal line of African kings. And when Livingston is entranced before committing suicide, we see again the movement into trance state and psychological reconciliation. Livingston’s eyes had been “fixed on vacancy” only a few paragraphs before, but under Ai’s trance, Livingston’s “spirit soared in regions of pure ethereal blue. A delicious torpor held him in its embrace” (620). Even though he dies, Livingston is offered a psychological recompense that is nearly commensurate with those received by
Briggs and Lusk. He is given a vision of spiritual beauty, psychological wholeness. Even more significantly, he is fully incorporated into the line of African kings. Hopkins explains that “Aubrey had become his own executioner according to the ancient laws of the inhabitants of Telassar. Members of the royal family in direct line to the throne became their own executioners when guilty of the crime of murder” (620). Livingston embodies the same counterfactual, alternative history that Briggs embodies. The figure of the white patriarch has been transmuted into the figure of the lost African prince. Rather than remembering that he has murdered—perpetuated the traumas of the slave system—Livingston is welcomed into the royal family that has for thousands of years been part of the secret protection of Africanness. He, too, is a lost royal of Telassar, the city that fictionally protected blacks from the Middle Passage and from bondage for thousands of years. The entire slave drama—with its white master, cuckolded black husband, and raped slave wife—is repeated only to be transformed into something completely different. Just as the tragic fall Marie witnessed as a child was transformed, under hypnosis, into a comical fall, the tragedy of black-white relations in the old South is transformed here into something unthreatening and romantic.

This welcoming of Livingston into the line of lost African kings points to the way in which the novel wrestles with a transnational and transpersonal black consciousness that is nonetheless part of a transnational and transpersonal human consciousness. If, as Salvant argues, Hopkins shows that all races are interconnected, and, as I argue, she shows that all minds are interconnected, then the novel’s unifying ideology seems at odds with its promotion of African greatness and transnational black consciousness. This is nowhere more visible than in the book’s treatment of Livingston. In the novel’s final moments, Livingston is welcomed into the line of lost African kings. But at the same time, he must die in order for this inclusion to take place. This contradiction points to the provisionality of Hopkins’s embrace of Jamesian ideas. Livingston is a lost African prince, and yet he cannot be healed of his role in the trauma without being destroyed. As in Lusk’s case, the trauma has been too deeply inscribed upon him to be erased. Livingston’s death, like Lusk’s, points ultimately to the novel’s skepticism about its own ostensible ideology—we are all “of one blood,” but African greatness is exclusive; our connected minds offer an avenue for healing, but no healing is total.

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If, as I argue, these moments of African connection are counterfactual in the sense of Janet’s alternative personal histories, one might be inclined to argue that Hopkins’s novel is parochial in its focus on the black US experience. By creating an  

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7 It is important to note that Jim Titus, Livingston’s black servant who is sent to Africa to kill Briggs, is excluded from this doubled drama. While Titus would seem to fit into the standard allegory—as the black slave who remains loyal to the white master—he is not offered a healing double. I suspect the logic of the novel has greater forgiveness for a white man who is wounded by enacting the expectations of his own racial identity than for a black man who betrays his people. To the end, Titus remains a cringing servant, obeying Charlie Vance’s instructions as
Africa that is merely a mirror for African American traumas, one might argue, Hopkins ignores the very real Africa of her own time. Hebert comes close to saying this when she writes that “by choosing to silence Dianthe, the highly miscegenated Fisk Jubilee Singer whose African identity is linked to her singing of the spirituals, Hopkins loses her opportunity to communicate with her ancestral past, ‘to invoke the idiom of African culture’ that could take her to a real Africa instead of a mythological one” (261).

Hebert argues that the mythological, or fantastic, aspects of the novel constitute a kind of failure—an inability to fully realize certain “unspeakable thoughts” that might become visible with a more fully articulated, contemporary Africa (269). And yet I think the mythological Africa—with its psychological connections to Hopkins’s three main African American characters—more fully maps the transnationalism of black trauma than any invocation of a contemporary Ethiopia could. As Du Bois writes, the experience of the African American is one of “two-ness”; one must be both “an American [and] a Negro” (194). By 1902 and 1903, Hopkins and other black intellectuals had largely moved beyond debates about the sites of black nationhood. The emigration societies and schemes of the antebellum period had long ago been revealed as impractical frauds.8 Viable black nationhood had a different rhetorical purpose and a different matrix of meanings for African Americans. And Hopkins, whose work for the Colored American Magazine kept her invested in the concerns of the black diaspora, was more interested, I think, in reconciling the psychologically divided identity that seemed to exist conterminously with blackness.

As Brown writes, Hopkins was deeply invested in the success of the two pan-African conferences of her day—the 1893 Chicago Conference on Africa and the larger 1900 Pan-African Conference in London (399–402). These conferences offer insights into the kind of transnational, or pan-African, vision Hopkins held. The London meeting offered as one of its goals an effort at “securing to all African races living in civilized countries their full rights and to promote their business interests” (qtd. in Brown 401). The effort here is not the promotion of particular black nations such as Haiti or Liberia. The conference instead was promoting beneficial interconnection across the diaspora. Implicit in this goal is a belief that the two attempt to escape from Telassar. While Titus seems to be forgiven in his final confession to Briggs, there is still a sense that his crime is greater than the crimes even of Livingston. Titus goes “to atone for the deeds done in the flesh.” Hopkins, Of One Blood 593; see 587–89.

8 This is not to say belief in the value of emigration had entirely disappeared. Even Colored American Magazine, which ran articles about global black uplift in its pages, also ran advertisements for emigration. The first issue containing Of One Blood also contained an advertisement for an emigration scheme. In one such notice, the authors write: “Here is an opportunity for those who have felt that Africa is the place for the Negro of America. The opposition to emigration schemes has been formidable because opportunities for immediately engaging in profitable work were considered poor. The English company has solved that part of the problem admirably by furnishing homes at once that are guaranteed to be comfortable which means much in a new country” (“Editorial and Publishers’ Announcements” 77). Despite this, it is clear even in the advertisement itself that passion for emigration had dwindled. Even the advertisement notes that “opposition to emigration schemes has been formidable.”
blacks in various countries suffer from a two-ness: they might live in “civilized countries” but they do not yet have their “full rights.” (Du Bois, who had written of a psychological two-ness among African Americans three years before, in 1897, was one of three official US representatives to the conference and helped approve its goals [Brown 401].) It is not merely African Americans who suffer from being simultaneously of a country and not of it, according to this logic. Blacks throughout the world suffer from this duality. This realization, I think, is at the root of the “insurgent cosmopolitanism” O’Brien identifies in Hopkins’s work (245). And if this is the pan-African context in which Hopkins was writing—one defined not by a desire to promote particular black nations but instead to promote the transnational uplift of the blacks from “civilized nations” throughout the diaspora—then her mythological Africa is perhaps more effective than a real one would have been. Conflicting identities—quasi citizenship in Euro-American nations and inescapable Africanness—must be reconciled. In the psychological framework of Hopkins’s time, shaped largely by James, this reconciliation must come with the counterfactual erasure of trauma.

Despite this, Hopkins clearly wants to move toward a more complex form of reconciliation. While she draws upon James repeatedly—with invocations of the “unclassified residuum,” with the repeated use of altered consciousnesses and counterfactual pasts, with the reconciliation of multiple selves—she is equally interested in a more complex treatment for the illness James diagnosed. If the problem of diasporic blacks is “two-ness,” to use Du Bois’s term, or “hidden selves,” to use James’s, then the solution must be a reconciliation of these selves, of this two-ness. But Janet’s treatment for insanity is insufficient. One cannot simply pretend that the trauma of kidnap, murder, rape, colonization, and enslavement never happened. One cannot substitute “a comical issue for the old tragical one,” as Janet did for Marie (“Hidden Self” 373). This is made clear by the way Hopkins resolves her plot—Ergamenes is left with the memory of his past as Briggs, Lusk dies as Queen Candace lives, the traitor Livingston can be accepted as a brother only after his suicide. The trauma is both real and remembered. It threatens to repeat itself as “mighty nations” penetrate “the dark, mysterious forests of [Briggs’s] native land” (621). The 1896 war between Ethiopia and Italy not only confirmed independent black nationhood; it confirmed that European nations might continue their attempts to subjugate free blacks both within Africa and outside it. James might optimistically tell his readers that “nothing less than the cure of insanity—that direst of human afflictions—lies possibly at the end” of his research (“Hidden Self” 372), but Hopkins seems keenly aware that the “insanity” brought on by the history of diasporic black trauma is not easily cured.

During the 1900 London conference (and more famously later), Du Bois would write that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line” (qtd. in Brown 401). Hopkins was aware that the problem for diasporic blacks was that they existed on both sides of the “colour line”—they could be both African and not African. This is why black nationalist readings of the novel are insufficient. Hebert’s concern that Hopkins “loses her opportunity” to produce a “real Africa instead of a mythological one” (261) ignores the reality that, for many blacks throughout the diaspora, the only Africa left was a mythological one. Hopkins’s
novel used the burgeoning science of Jamesian psychology to introduce a diasporic readership to its mythical self, to reconcile the trauma of oppression with its counterfactual opposite. And while Hopkins was not nearly as optimistic as James about the possibility of forgetting—Ergamenes never forgets that he is also Briggs—she sees a need for blacks to embrace their two-ness, to maintain an unmolested African self in the face of global oppression and trauma. By 1902, Africa was no longer conceived of as a real place to which the blacks of the diaspora might return. Instead, it was a mythical place, a place embedded in the psychology of the oppressed, a place that lived in the other half of the divided mind. Of One Blood draws upon this place to bring its unconscious power to consciousness, to allow the “two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings” of the diasporic mind to finally be reconciled (Du Bois 194). This reconciliation is not fully Jamesian. It is not based upon forgetting. But it is rooted in the knowledge that individuals are internally divided, that they must acknowledge their “hidden selves,” and that they are ultimately interconnected.

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